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Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic 
Stakeholders: Re-conceptualizing the Means and 
Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in 
the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis 
Introduction: Corporate Governance in Crisis? An Opportunity to 
Re-think the Ends and Means of Governance 
“The business of business is business.” 
– Milton Friedman1 
 
“In its broadest sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the 
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society.” 
– Sir Adrian Cadbury2 
 
 
© 2014 Zhong Xing Tan 
 *  Zhong Xing Tan, Sheridan Fellow, National University of Singapore, Faculty of Law 
 1. Widely attributed to Friedman, this well-known phrase may have been derived from a statement in his 
book, which states, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
 2. Sir Adrian Cadbury, Foreword to STIJN CLAESSENS, Corporate Governance and Development, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (2003), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7fc17c0048a7e6dda8b7e 
f6060ad5911/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
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The recent global financial crisis has been described as a “perfect storm of 
economic conditions.”3 In dissecting the anatomy of this disaster, commentators 
have highlighted numerous factors, from global trade imbalances, to financial 
market innovation, and the poverty of free market ideology.4 Amidst the discussion 
of such macro-environment factors, attention has turned toward the key micro 
factor in the crisis: the failure of corporate governance, and in particular the Anglo-
American model, to curb excessive risk-taking and protect the interests of the 
financial system and wider economy.5 As Sullivan notes: “The current crisis can be 
best understood as a crisis of governance rather than an inherent failure of markets 
or capitalism itself.”6 
The financial crisis thus compels us to re-examine current Anglo-American 
paradigms of corporate governance across two key planes: i) the ends of corporate 
governance – viz, for what purpose and in whose interests is the company governed, 
and ii) the means of governance – whether the current mix of strategies involving 
directors and shareholders is adequate. The central thrust of this thesis is that the 
ends of governance must be expanded past maximizing shareholder value to include 
the interests of financial and economic stability, and that the means of governance - 
viz, the roles and responsibilities of directors and shareholders – must be re-
calibrated in the light of this larger objective. Broadly, this includes changes to 
board composition, structure and duties; as well as increasing the responsibilities of 
shareholders. Collectively, directors and shareholders are both to be seen as stewards 
for the wider system’s stake in the company. 
The balance of this discussion proceeds as follows. Part I argues that the ends of 
corporate governance must be expanded to include the protection of the economic 
and financial system (the “systemic stakeholder” model). The leading competitor of 
this wider paradigm, the shareholder value maximization model, is first questioned, 
before the systemic stakeholder model is justified on a risk-based model of 
stakeholding. Part II proceeds to analyze how current corporate governance 
mechanisms – the board of directors and shareholders – are insufficient to protect 
the interests of systemic stakeholders, and explains how particular failures of board 
composition, structure and duties, as well as a lack of shareholder responsibility, 
were facilitative of the financial crisis. My critique is sensitive to the differences in 
the US and UK models of corporate governance, yet will show how each is 
 
 3. Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2009, 
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 1, 1 (Dec. 8, 2008), www.wlrk.com/docs/ThoughtsforDirectors2009.pdf.  
 4. See A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, THE TURNER REVIEW, Mar. 2009, at 1, 11-14 
(discussing issues contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis); see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: 
FREE MARKETS AND THE SINKING OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010) (same). 
 5. Suzanne Young & Vijaya Thyil, A Holistic Approach to Corporate Governance: Lessons from the Financial 
Crisis and the Way Forward, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 365, 365 (William Sun, Jim Stewart, David Pollard eds., 2011). 
 6. Rodney Sullivan, Finance Briefing: The Crisis is One of Governance, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 2, 2009, 
06:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58109850-7f4f-11de-85dc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qhgaF21V. 
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particularly deficient. Part III then suggests how corporate governance can be 
reformed in order to safeguard the interests of systemic stakeholders against 
excessive corporate risk-taking. These reforms include:  
1. re-composing the board to emphasize competence as well as independence, 
and enhancing diversity; 
2. re-structuring the board to include new board structures and ideas of network 
governance to facilitate integrated risk management; 
3. re-invigorating board duties to encompass oversight responsibility for risk 
management; and 
4. re-conceiving the role of shareholders to emphasize responsibilities to 
corporate stakeholders. 
It is concluded that the financial crisis has offered an opportunity for a holistic re-
appraisal of the ends and means of Anglo-American corporate governance, one 
which we must seize in order to ensure that our legal regimes and regulatory 
structures remain dynamically relevant and responsive to the needs of our time. 
I. Re-thinking the Ends of Corporate Governance – Expanding the 
Paradigm to Include Protection of Systemic Stakeholders 
The goal of corporate governance should go beyond furthering the interests of 
shareholders to include protecting the interests of systemic stakeholders.7 A systemic 
stakeholder is a socio-economic actor who may not be immediately connected to 
the company through its usual nexus of contracts (for example, employees, 
suppliers and customers); but who nonetheless has extended connections to the 
company (for example, financial firms via links such as payment and settlement 
systems).8 Accordingly, the protection of systemic stakeholders equates to the 
protection of the stability and sustainability of the economic and financial system, 
its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks and absorb 
shocks.9 In more tangible terms, it is thus proposed that corporate governance 
mechanisms must go beyond only maximizing shareholder value to also minimizing 
systemic risk –the risk that a company’s actions may have widespread negative 
repercussions on other social and economic actors due to the interconnectedness 
between the firm and the economy.10 
 
 7. See infra Part I.A and related notes. 
 8. James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A 
Primer, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, September/October Part 1 2009, 403 at 408, available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/09/part1/Bullard.pdf. 
 9. Eddy Wymeersch, Corporate Governance and Financial Stability 1 (Ghent Univ. Fin. Law Inst. Working 
Paper No. 2008-11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288631. 
 10. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 202–04 (2008) (discussing systemic risk from 
institutional and market perspectives). 
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This section can be summarized as follows: firstly, I contrast the two main 
paradigms of corporate governance – shareholder and stakeholder models, 
demonstrating how they diverge on the question of “In whose interests should the 
company be governed?” Secondly, I point out how the shareholder paradigm is 
fundamentally flawed – its usual justifications based on agency, residual claimant 
and ownership theories are mistaken; nor does the shareholder paradigm promote 
economic efficiency – instead it may lead to short-termism and economic 
instability; nor is the shareholder paradigm as ubiquitous as it is made out to be. 
Thirdly, I justify the argument that corporate governance should protect the 
interests of systemic stakeholders on a risk-based conception of stakeholding. 
Further, I address four main objections to the systemic stakeholder paradigm – i) 
that it applies only to financial firms and has no corporate governance implications 
for non-financials, ii) that the protection of systemic stakeholders is the province of 
other regulatory regimes apart from corporate governance, iii) that protection of 
systemic stakeholders is far too broad and unverifiable an objective for corporate 
governance, and iv) that the protection of systemic stakeholders mutually excludes 
the pursuit of profit maximization and hence is damaging to the survival of the 
firm. It is concluded that the ends of corporate governance – its raison d’être – must 
include the protection of the economy and financial system. 
A. Paradigms of Corporate Governance: Shareholder versus Stakeholder Models 
In whose interests should the company be governed? The two paradigmatic models 
of corporate governance, shareholder value maximization and stakeholder theory, 
provide sharply contrasting answers to this question. The shareholder-oriented view 
holds that the corporation is formed from a nexus of private contracts, a private 
entity whose primary purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.11 The contrasting 
view is stakeholder-oriented: positing that the company has both public and private 
roles, thus behoving it to be managed in the interests of a broader range of 
stakeholders, including employees, consumers, and the wider public.12 
The polarities of these two paradigms of corporate governance are clearly 
reflected in legal instruments as well - the UK Hampel Report of 1998 clearly tends 
towards shareholder primacy, stating that: “[T]he importance of corporate 
governance lies in its contribution both to business prosperity and to 
accountability. . .But the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure a 
board’s first responsibility—to enhance the prosperity of the business over 
time. . .”13 In contrast, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance state that 
 
 11. Virginia E. Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L.J. 59, 71 (2010) (discussing stakeholders under corporate law). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Sally Wheeler, Board Composition and Female Non-Executive Directors, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 272, 273 (Ian MacNeil & Justin O’ Brien eds., 2010). 
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policy and regulation should provide firms with “incentives and discipline to 
minimize the divergence between private and social returns and to protect the 
interests of stakeholders.”14 
B. The Shareholder Value Maximization Paradigm Questioned 
1. Agency and Residual Claimant Theories Do Not Solely Support Shareholder 
Value Maximization 
Agency Theory 
One of the most common justifications for the idea that the company should be 
governed solely in the interests of shareholders is agency theory, which starts with 
the Berle-Means observation that as countries industrialize and develop their 
markets, ownership and control of companies become separated. In the light of this 
separation, owners (as principals) appoint managers (as agents) to control the 
company on their behalf.15 However, as Jensen and Meckling point out, there are 
conflicts of interest between the principals and agents, because managers would 
want to act in their own self-interest by extracting benefits from the company or 
pursuing self-aggrandizing projects16 Such opportunistic behaviour results in agency 
costs to the company, which include the losses in corporate value to principals.17 
Shareholder primacy theorists reason that the very purpose of corporate governance 
law is to reduce such agency costs – viz, to protect the interests of vulnerable 
principals against opportunistic agents. Accordingly, because shareholders are such 
principals, corporate law should be geared towards promoting their interests. 
The fallacy in the reasoning of shareholder primacy theorists lies not in the idea 
that corporate governance mechanisms should protect the interests of principals 
vis-à-vis agents – which is a correct insight; but that shareholders are the only 
principals for whom corporate law should act. While the separation of ownership 
and control undoubtedly creates one type of agency problem, multiple agency 
problems can arise in the context of the company. As Alexander, Dhumale and 
Eatwell point out, agency problems “arise because responsibility for decision 
making is directly or indirectly delegated from one stakeholder group to another in 
situations where stakeholder groups have different objectives and where complete 
information that would allow the first group to exert control over the decision 
 
 14. MAGDI ISKANDER & NADEREH CHAMLOU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION—OVERVIEW 4 (1999). 
 15. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, (1998); see also JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 15 (2006) (discussing corporate governance and the separation of ownership 
and control). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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maker is not readily available.”18 For example, agency problems regularly arise 
between majority (controlling) shareholders as agents and minority (non-
controlling) shareholders as principals; or between controlling shareholders as 
agents and non-controlling stakeholders as principals (such as creditors, employees 
and customers).19 As such, shareholders are not the only vulnerable constituency 
which corporate law must protect. Recently, the economic system has itself been 
recognized as one such vulnerable principal – because excessive risk-taking by the 
company can impose wider agency costs (or “negative externalities”) on society in 
the form of economic losses, financial destabilization, and more intangible 
repercussions on the social fabric.20 
Residual Claimant Theory 
The shareholder primacy theorist might further buttress her argument by 
contending that shareholders are not simply vulnerable principals; but that they are 
a unique type of principals: residual claimants. According to this theory, the 
company should be governed solely in the interests of shareholders because they 
alone have a financial stake in the company not protected by explicit contracts (a 
“residual interest”). Unlike employees and creditors whose interests are explicitly 
protected by contract, the shareholders’ dividend depends on the company’s 
success, and they alone bear risks from discretionary decisions made by the 
company.21 
The assumption that shareholders are the sole residual claimants of the firm has 
been pointed out to be false. Firstly, commentators have highlighted the existence of 
implicit contracts, where other stakeholders such as employees make firm-specific 
investments that are not necessarily protected by formal contracts, such as where a 
company enters into an implicit understanding with its employees that a good faith 
effort will be made to pay out significant bonuses in addition to lower fixed wages.22 
Another example from continental Europe is where employees are implicitly 
promised certain monetary benefits upon the termination of their contracts.23 In 
such cases, employees have financial stakes in the company that depend on the 
value of the firm, which are unprotected by contract – thus they bear the risks of 
 
 18. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 243 (2006). 
 19. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 35-36 (2d ed. 2009). 
 20. Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk 
Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1450-51 (2010). 
 21. Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing the Efficiency of Board Decision Making: Lessons Learned From The 
Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 813, 827–28 (2009). 
 22. Id. at 828. 
 23. J. Matthijs de Jongh, Are Shareholders the Only Residual Claimants?, THE DEFINING TENSION (Dec. 7, 
2009), http://www.thedefiningtension.com. 
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bad corporate decisions. In the context of the financial crisis, another group of 
residual claimants has been identified: the wider public, which does not have its 
interest in economic stability protected by any form of legal contract and has to 
incur the costs to the economy of excessive risk-taking by bailing out 
dysfunctionally-governed corporations such as AIG, to the tune of over US$180 
billion worth of issued loans and guarantees on AIG debt and derivatives 
contracts.24 Given that the public’s finances are directly affected by the failure of 
systemically-linked companies, residual claimant theory would likewise 
countenance taking the interests of the economy into account. 
2. The Ownership Concept of Shareholding is Misleading 
Another justification for the company to be governed in the interests of 
shareholders is the common perception that shareholders own the company. The 
company itself is seen as a species of private property, capable of being owned.25 
Analogizing from proprietary concepts, Eisenberg has argued that shareholders 
possess most incidents of ownership, for example the “rights to possess, use, and 
manage, and the rights to income and to capital.”26 In contrast, while creditors, 
customers, suppliers and the wider public may have various rights and interests in 
the company, they do not have the same measure of proprietary interest; hence their 
interests are permanently subordinated to that of shareholders.27 
The assumption that shareholders are owners, whose interests the company 
should solely take into account, is highly questionable – albeit intuitively appealing 
and deeply-rooted. Bainbridge points out that what shareholders own is stock, 
which represents but a proportionate claim on the company’s net assets in the event 
of liquidation; the right to a pro rata share of dividends subject to declaration by the 
board of directors; and limited electoral rights.28 Importantly, shareholders’ 
ownership of stock does not entitle them to use or possesses corporate property, 
irrespective of whether the shareholder has a majority or minority interest, or 
whether shareholders are acting individually or collectively.29 
Further, Ireland and Sealy have emphasized that shareholder ownership is a legal 
fiction that is far out of touch with the economy reality of how shareholders operate 
in modern day capital markets.30 Shareholders today largely hold a diversified basket 
of securities as passive investors “standing outside the company and the production 
 
 24. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE AGE OF 
FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 3–4 (2010). 
 25. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 234–36 (2012). 
 26. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature 
of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825 (1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 234-36.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MOD. L. REV. 32, 33 (1999). 
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process.”31 In comparison with debenture holders, for example, while their legal 
characteristics may seem distinguishable (debenture holders having rights to being 
repaid with interest; while shareholders having rights to dividends), the economic 
reality is that both are treated as securities in the corporate sector of the economy 
offering different kinds of risks and returns.32 Shareholders, like debenture holders, 
are simply “money capitalists. . .[d]isinterested and uninvolved in management, 
and, in any case largely stripped (in law as well as in economic reality) of genuine 
corporate ownership rights.”33 
Finally, the idea of shareholding as ownership falls prey to a common mistake in 
reasoning - what Bainbridge terms the “reification” fallacy.34 Behind the fiction of 
legal personality, a company is not a thing capable of being owned or a mere 
collection of assets; but an aggregate of “relationships between the people who have 
various stakes in the enterprise”,35 including, inter alia, shareholders who provide 
initial equity capital, creditors who provide debt capital, and employees who 
provide labour. It would be fallacious to reason that this set of relationships, 
commonly described as a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contractual 
relationships, is reducible to an object of property.36 Reification – treating an 
abstraction as the real thing – is a semantically-useful shorthand for attributing 
responsibility in both common parlance and in law; but on the other hand, it 
unhelpfully obscures the reality that shareholders are but one set of stakeholders in 
a complex web of interconnected relationships that make up the company.37 
3. Shareholder Value Maximization Can Exacerbate Short-termist Pressures and Is 
Not Always Economically Desirable 
It has been contended that the shareholder value maximization model is the most 
economically-desirable model of corporate governance. Hansmann and Kraakman, 
in their influential, albeit controversial, article “The End of History for Corporate 
Law”, argue that countries such as America, which adopted the shareholder 
primacy model, have shown much stronger economic performance than countries 
that tend towards other models, such as German and French economies, which 
tend towards a more stakeholder-oriented view.38 Further, they assert that 
shareholder-oriented models have competitive advantages over firms adhering to 
 
 31. Id. at 42. 
 32. Id. at 47. 
 33. Id.  
 34. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 235.  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 776 (2006). 
 35. Id. at 234–36. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 235. 
 38. Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 450 
(2001). 
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other models because they can access equity capital at a lower cost, enabling them 
to penetrate new product markets more quickly, leading to greater economic 
returns in aggregate social welfare.39 
These assertions, made in 2000, have been left bare in the wake of the 2009 
financial crisis, which has demonstrated that a shareholder-centric view can lead to 
short-termist corporate strategies, which are ultimately destabilizing for the entire 
economy. As Cioffi notes: “One of the troubling paradoxes [of the financial crisis] is 
that pro-shareholder legal reforms adopted throughout the world intensified the 
incentives for short-termism, excessive risk taking, and managerial rent seeking.40 
The crisis could not have become so devastating if corporate governance regimes 
had effectively protected and promoted the long-term interests of the shareholders 
and stakeholders.”41 Indeed, shareholders are seen to have precipitated the crisis 
rather than being unfortunate victims of it.42 
To elaborate, the problems with shareholder-centrism began in the later part of 
the 20th century, with the rise of what commentators call “financial capitalism” – the 
increasing role of financial markets, actors, institutions and motives in the 
operation of the domestic and international economy.43 With financialization, a 
new set of shareholders entered the scene and began to influence corporate 
governance – institutional investors such as pension funds and retail funds, and 
investors with short-term time horizons such as hedge funds and private equity.44 
These investors were less concerned with long-term value maximization of 
particular firms than with maximizing the earnings of a basket of securities 
denoting equity or debt interests in various companies. This financial motivation 
drove the expansion of stock markets and the creation of new financial products 
used for speculative investment, where capital markets would allow quick entry and 
exit into the equity interest of a firm, regardless of what it might entail for the long- 
term health of any one company.45 For example, in 2006, shares of NYSE-listed 
companies turned over at a rate of 118% - every share of stock being traded on 
average at least once during that year, an evident sign of speculation.46 The support 
 
 39. Id. at 450–51. 
 40. CIOFFI, supra note 24, at 206. 
 41. Id.  
 42. See, e.g., Charlotte Villiers, Has the Financial Crisis Revealed the Concept of the ‘Responsible Owner’ to Be 
a Myth?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 287 (Iain MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010) (questioning 
whether shareholders bear responsibility for the financial crisis because “they could have been more diligent, 
supervised [their] agents better, and ensured that executive remuneration reflected real performance and long-
term thinking.”). 
 43. See MARKUS KALLIFATIDES ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MODERN FINANCIAL CAPITALISM: OLD 
MUTUAL’S HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF SKANDIA 4 (2010).   
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. Nadelle Grossman, Short-Term Fling or Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 
BEPRESS.COM 7–8 (March 2009), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002 &context=nadelle_ 
grossman.  
 46. Id. at 8. 
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given by shareholders to short-termist corporate strategies was enhanced by the fact 
that governments (particularly in the US) gave implicit guarantees to large 
companies which were “too big to fail” – thus shareholders would favour excessive 
risk that increased potential returns because they discount losses that taxpayers 
would potentially bear.47 
The negative repercussions on the economy of short-termist strategies favoured 
by shareholders are clearly demonstrated by the financial crisis. Shareholders of US 
financial firms supported the acquisition of mortgage-backed securities (MBOs) 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), securities whose payments derive from 
mortgage loans and mixed pools of receivables, respectively.48 These investments 
were tied to the short-term increase in housing prices rather than any sustainable 
increase in long-term economic value. Once home prices plummeted in 2008, 
borrowers defaulted on their loans - loans which backed the MBOs and CDOs - 
such that financial firms lost much of the value of their assets.49 Unfortunately, these 
losses were not isolated but had effects on the wider economy: credit markets began 
to dry up, making it difficult for enterprises to acquire debt-financing, start-up 
capital and R&D funding – the lifeblood of corporate growth.50 Without thriving 
businesses, the ripple effects extended to increasing unemployment and lower 
economic growth overall. This explication of the links between shareholder-
centrism and the financial crisis thus demonstrates that governing the corporation 
solely in the interests of shareholders is not always conducive to economic growth; 
and as the crisis indicates, may in fact be inimical to sustainable economic 
development. 
4. The Ubiquity of the Shareholder Value Maximization Model Is Questionable 
One final argument for shareholder primacy is its ubiquity and inevitability.51 
Hansmann and Kraakman famously assert that the shareholder-centric view 
dominates business, government and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions, 
and that with the current emergent consensus, global convergence towards this 
paradigm is inevitable, hence “the end of history for corporate law.”52 
The first objection one might raise is that even if shareholder-centrism is the case 
in reality, this does not mean that it should be the ideal paradigm of corporate 
governance. Thus one may argue that Hansmann and Kraakman have attempted to 
 
 47. Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 87, 94 
(The Tobin Project et al. eds., 2009). See also Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 11. 
 48. Grossman, supra note 45, at 34. 
 49. Id. at 34–35. See also Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 14. 
 50. Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 51. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 449–51 (contending that the shareholder-oriented model 
achieved ubiquity because alternative models failed, and because the forces of logic, example, and competition 
demonstrated its superiority). 
 52. Id. at 449–50. 
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draw normative justification for the shareholder-centric paradigm from merely 
descriptive premises, the fallacy of deriving an “is” from an “ought”. 
Secondly, one can object that shareholder-centrism correctly reflects the reality 
of corporate law as it stands in the world today. No small number of commentators 
have accurately pointed out that explaining the state of corporate governance in a 
one-dimensional paradigm is flawed, missing out on the diversity of corporate 
governance paradigms across jurisdictions, such as the existence and persistence of 
the German co-determination model which institutionally includes stakeholders 
such as employees on the supervisory board.53 Further, as Puchniak observes, the 
assumption of inevitability misses the fact that corporate governance “adapt[s] to fit 
its ever-changing environment.”54 American corporate governance, the supposedly 
paradigmatic example of shareholder-centrism, has in fact moved toward certain 
aspects of the Japanese main bank model, for example with the rise of American 
institutional shareholders who resemble Japanese stable shareholders under the 
main bank model.55 Indeed, other aspects of US corporate governance indicate that 
it has also adopted characteristics of a stakeholder-centric model. For example, 
commentators note the rise of non-shareholder constituency statutes in at least 
thirty states, which permit or require directors to consider the impact of their 
decisions on non-shareholding stakeholders.56 Pennsylvania, for one, allows 
directors to consider the effect of their decisions not just on shareholders, but on 
“employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon 
communities.”57 Such statutes are inconsistent with a pure shareholder primacy 
norm and suggest a degree of stakeholder-orientation. 
C. The Systemic Stakeholder Model Justified 
While we may effectively conclude that shareholder value maximization is not 
supportable by agency, residual claimant, or ownership theories; and that it is not 
economically desirable, nor ubiquitous and inevitable, we do need a justifiable 
alternative paradigm. It is argued that this paradigm should be a systemic 
stakeholder model, where the ends of corporate governance should go beyond 
furthering the interests of shareholders to include the protection of the interests of 
systemic stakeholders: socio-economic actors who may not be immediately 
 
 53. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending Story?, 
86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 489–90 (2011).  See generally LAY HONG TAN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED 
COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE (2006). 
 54. Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending 
History for Corporate Law, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 69–70 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 25–33. 
 56. Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L. REV. 979, 988 
(2009).  See also Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Financial Crisis: Impetus for Restoring Corporate Democracy, 
2010 MIDWEST ACAD. LEGAL STUDIES IN BUS. 1, 10, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529733. 
 57. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (2013). 
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connected to the company through its usual nexus of contracts but who nonetheless 
have extended connections to the company.58 To put it another way, the goal of 
corporate governance mechanisms must go beyond only maximizing shareholder 
value to also minimizing systemic risk: the risk that a company’s actions may have 
widespread negative repercussions on other socio-economic actors in the economic 
or financial system.59 
1. The Financial System and Economy Qualify as Stakeholders Under a Risk-based 
Model of Stakeholding 
The basic idea of a “stakeholder” whose interests the company should take into 
account was articulated as early as 1932 by E. Merrick Dodd Jr., who argued that a 
company’s “[p]ower over the lives of others tends to create on the part of those 
most worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility”, and that this “sense of 
responsibility toward employees, consumers, and the general public may thus come 
to be regarded as the appropriate attitude to be adopted by those who are engaged 
in business.”60 As Kershaw observes, Dodd’s basic insight is that large companies 
will wield tremendous power and influence over the lives of all members of society, 
whether in providing goods, services or employment, and accordingly, with this 
power comes the responsibility to act in the wider interests of society.61 
While Dodd’s basic insight has been refined subsequently by various theorists,62 
one of the more compelling and influential conceptions is Max Clarkson’s risk-
based model of stakeholding. According to Clarkson, the key to defining a stake in a 
company is whether one has an economic interest at risk in the firm63 – thus this 
includes, but is not limited to, shareholders (who risk the loss of their investment), 
creditors (who risk default on their loans), and employees (who risk dismissal or 
under-compensation). Because these actors have stakes in the company, they  
 
 
 58. Bullard, supra note 8, at 407–09. 
 59. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). 
 60. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1157, 1160 
(1932). 
 61. DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 223 (2009). 
 62. For example, Evan and Freeman argue for a theory of ‘Kantian capitalism’, citing Kant’s notion that 
people should be treated as an end and never a means, thus the welfare employees, consumers and the wider 
public should equally be the ends of enterprise. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE 
OF THE ART 214 (2010). 
 63. Specifically, Clarkson defines stakeholders as people who “bear some form of risk as a result of having 
invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm.” Andrew Keay, Stakeholder 
Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 259 (2010) (quoting Max 
B. E. Clarkson, A Risk-based Model of Stakeholder Theory (The Ctr. for Corporate Soc. Performance and Ethics, 
Working Paper, 1995)). See also Deborah Vidavier-Cohen, Taking a Risk: Max Clarkson’s Impact on Stakeholder 
Theory, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 39, 39 (1999), available at http://bas.sagepub.com/content/38/1/6.citation. 
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therefore have claims on how it should allocate resources under its control.64 
One of the key advantages of a risk-based conception is that it is neither over-
inclusive nor under-inclusive. Other theories which define a stakeholder as any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the firm are subject to the 
charge of being overbroad – based on such conceptions, even entities that have no 
clearly identifiable interests such as the natural environment, would also be 
considered a stakeholder.65 At the same time, it avoids being restricted to unduly 
narrow definitions which include only those actors who have immediate and 
contractual interactions with the company (for example, customers, suppliers and 
employees). 
Based on Clarkson’s risk model, one can reason that the financial system or 
economy itself is a stakeholder in the company. For example, a large financial firm 
is generally linked with the financial system through a web of financial relationships 
and through its participation in capital markets.66 Because of these interconnections, 
there exists the risk that losses to one firm will set in motion “a series of successive 
losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a system.”67 This is known 
as systemic risk – “the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected dominos.”68 
For example, in the payments network, the Board of Governors of the US Federal 
Reserve has emphasized that systemic risk can occur if a financial firm participating 
in a payments network is unable to settle its net debt position, which would in turn 
result in the institution’s creditors being unable to settle their commitments.69 This 
ripple effect may extend even to depository institutions not participating in the 
network, and to the real (non-financial) economy consequently.70 Thus, if risk is the 
touchstone of stakeholding, it follows that systemic risk behoves the company to 
take into account the interests of systemic stakeholders. In a particularly striking 
metaphor, the ex-governor of the Bank of England, E.A.J. George, described the 
fates of the company and the financial system as being “tie[d]. . .like mountaineers, 
so that if one falls off the rock face others are pulled off too.”71 
 
 64. Keay, supra note 63, at 256 (“All those who contribute critical resources to the corporation should 
benefit. So, rather than the corporation working to create value for shareholders, the stakeholder theory adheres 
to the idea that the corporation works towards creation of value for all stakeholders. Furthermore, it is 
fundamental to stakeholding that organisations are managed for the benefit of, and accountable to, all 
stakeholders.”). 
 65. Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory 12 BUSINESS 
ETHICS QUARTERLY 215, 218 (2002). 
 66. Bullard, supra note 8, at 408. 
 67. George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or 
Contribute to It? 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 372 n. 3 (2003). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Dodd, supra note 60, at 1156. 
 71. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 67, at 373. 
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2. Objection 1: Is the Systemic Stakeholder Model Relevant Only to Financial Firms? 
One may counter that the above-mentioned argument - that the financial system 
and economy are stakeholders - applies solely to financial firms. Hence, its 
corporate governance implications are limited and this thesis should perhaps be 
confined to the corporate governance of banking institutions. It is acknowledged 
that the problem of systemic risk is especially acute in financial firms.72 As various 
commentators have pointed out, the degree of interconnectedness within the 
financial system is heightened because of interbank loan and deposit markets, and 
payment and settlement systems.73 Heremans explains that “the banking system 
contains powerful propagation mechanisms that can amplify small initial shocks as 
they are much more interconnected than is the case in other sectors of the 
economy.”74 
Non-Financial Firms Undertaking Non-Financial Activities Can Also Present 
Systemic Risks 
However, to presume systemic risk is a problem only in the financial sector is 
myopic – all large industrial and commercial companies pose some degree of risk to 
the wider economic system were they to fail.75 Levitin gives the example of the 
failure of a large aerospace manufacturer, which would cause losses not just to 
counterparties such as parts suppliers and airlines that have paid in advance for 
aircraft; but would have ripple effects on airlines’ ability to cater to the demand for 
air travel, and the efficiency of global transportation as a whole.76 Similarly, the 
failure of a large commercial company such as US. 
Wal-Mart would result in massive economic dislocations, because Wal-Mart is 
not only a major buyer of products from thousands of companies, but also creates 
an entire value-chain of logistics businesses between manufacturers, warehouses, 
and stores.77 Thus, non-financial firms which are strategically and systemically 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence 2 
(Global Corporate Governance Forum, Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
0fa1e18048a7e589a23fe76060ad5911/DP_3_CG_of_Banks_Levine_2003.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. See also, Andrea 
Polo, The Corporate Governance of Banks: The Current State of the Debate 2 (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Faculty 
of Economic and Business Sciences, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958796 and Vasile Corcis & 
Maria Cristina Ugureanu, Why are Banks Special? An Approach From the Corporate Governance Perspective 56 
(University Iasi Economic Series, Paper No. 54, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090291. 
 74. Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks: A Financial Stability Perspective 5 (Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven Center for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 07.07, 2007) available at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/120504/1/Dps0707.pdf.  
 75. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435, 453–54 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 353. 
 77. Id.  
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important to fuelling the economic engine can be as vital to the economy as 
financial institutions. 
Non-Financial Firms May Act Like Financial Firms and thus Present Systemic Risks 
Additionally, firms that may appear to be non-financial in nature (that is, non-
banking or insurance-type firms) are often plugged into the financial markets and 
regularly participate in financial activities. A common example would be vehicle 
manufacturers and major retailers which have affiliated sales and financing arms, 
enabling them to undertake transactions such as credit-sales where the primary 
element of the transaction – the sale – is accompanied by a financial intermediation 
function.78 General Motors, while primarily involved in vehicle manufacturing, is 
closely affiliated with Ally Financial (previously General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation), which supports the manufacturing and sales arm of General Motors 
by providing auto financing, insurance and mortgage services.79 Thus it is difficult 
to draw the line between firms that are purely financial and those that are purely 
commercial or industrial.80 
Furthermore, such non-financials which undertake financial activities can 
consequently present a huge systemic risk to the wider economy. Perhaps the most 
egregious example of this is Enron. Enron, which began life as a transporter of 
natural gas, subsequently desired to transform itself into a pure financial 
intermediary where it would create a proprietary marketplace and match up energy 
producers, carriers and users; as well as provide risk management products in the 
form of derivative contracts which covered its customers’ exposure to price risks.81 
Enron’s derivative business evolved into a speculative trading arm and was one of 
the major sources of market and credit risk to the firm, placing bets on rising energy 
prices which ultimately failed.82 Bratton explains that “Enron collapsed the same 
way banks routinely collapsed in days before deposit insurance. It did so because it 
had largely succeeded in realizing Skilling’s [the Enron CEO] vision of becoming a 
financial institution.”83 Further, Enron’s interconnections with the entire energy 
industry, financial markets and society (through employment and pensions) meant 
that its excessive risk-taking threatened the wider economy. As Merson points out: 
“[I]f Enron had continued to succeed making ever-rising profits by amoral 
means. . .then shareholders’ interests may have been served with the denial of every 
other conceivable interest as the company continued to hike prices by exercising 
monopoly power, destabilising essential energy and other services, creating 
 
 78. Id. at 454. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1288 (2002). 
 82. Id. at 1289. 
 83. Id. at 1360.  
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volatility in markets that undermined the prospects of continuing normal business 
in other industries, and damaging people’s lives as a result.”84 Thus, it is clear that 
large interconnected non-financials which are significantly involved in financial 
activities can present systemic risks. 
Finally, the argument that all large companies - and not just financial institutions 
- should be cognizant of risks to the system, derives additional support from 
corporate governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis, which generally 
apply to large listed companies – whether or not they are financial institutions.85 For 
example, although Sir David Walker’s initial mandate by the UK government was to 
review the governance of banks and other financial institutions, the UK Financial 
Reporting Council eventually imported substantial parts of the Walker 
recommendations into its 2009 Review of the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, emphasizing that the corporate governance implications from 
financial institutions’ failures to manage systemic risk apply to non-financial 
institutions as well.86 
Thus, it is submitted that the systemic stakeholder model should apply to all 
public listed companies, whether or not they are financial institutions. The basis for 
excluding private and non-listed public companies is that these firms may vary 
considerably in size, and thus their “too big to fail” potential may not always be 
clear and present. On the other hand, public listed companies have to meet 
minimum market capitalization standards – for example, the NYSE requires 
US$150 million based on its “Assets and Equity” test for global market 
capitalization.87 The size of the company thus serves as a fairly accurate proxy for its 
economic presence, and accordingly, the potential risk it presents to the system 
were it to collapse. 
3. Objection 2: Should Systemic Stakeholders be Protected by Regulatory Regimes 
Other than Corporate Governance Law? 
Some commentators agree that the interests of systemic stakeholders are important, 
and that systemic risk should be reduced, but take the position that this objective is 
not within the purview of corporate law. Corporate law should simply be a tool for 
maximizing shareholder interests, while the separate objective of controlling risks to 
the system can be achieved by putting in place banking or financial regulations, 
 
 84. RUPERT MERSON, RULES ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE ART OF GOVERNANCE IN THE REAL WORLD 101 (Profile 
Books, LTD., 2010). 
 85. See generally, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–39 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2010), available at www.unctad.org/isar. 
 86. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, 2009 REVIEW OF THE COMBINED CODE: FINAL REPORT 10–11 (Dec. 
2009). 
 87. U.S. Listing Standards, NYSE EURONEXT (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:31PM), http://usequities.nyx.com/regulation/ 
listed-companies-compliance/listings-standards/us. 
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such as capital requirements.88 Along the same lines, Hansmann and Kraakman 
have previously asserted a parallel position with respect to stakeholders such as 
workers and consumers, who are allegedly protected by health and safety law, and 
product liability law, respectively.89 
This reasoning is fallacious because it assumes that banking or financial 
regulations can completely curb risk to systemic stakeholders. For example, Gevurtz 
points out that capital requirements to curb excessive risk work only to a limited 
extent.90 Capital requirements, in the context of financial firms, are legal obligations 
on firms to hold a certain amount of retained earnings, reserves, and amounts 
received for common and preferred stock, as a percentage of the firm’s total assets – 
in order to provide a cushion to insure that a firm can still meet its obligations to 
depositors despite losses in its investment and lending portfolio.91 However, such 
requirements only mitigate the consequences of excessive risk-taking, rather than 
curbing risk-taking behaviour. In fact, capital requirements may in fact perversely 
produce an incentive to take greater risks to ensure a higher return on investments, 
since more capital is set aside to cushion possible losses.92 Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether capital requirements are sufficient to meet obligations owed to creditors 
(in the banking setting, depositors) given many investors’ short-term horizons, 
which would predispose them toward risk-taking way in excess of capital cushions. 
As Guvertz puts it: “The mathematics of banking is such that unless one makes the 
capital requirement so large as to undercut the banking function altogether, 
investments that are not in the interest of depositors still may make sense for the 
shareholders despite the risk to capital. Compounding this problem is the fact that 
the cost of a bank’s collapse may be systemic damage to the broader economy, 
which could even exceed the depositors’ losses.”93 
Furthermore, claiming that the problem of systemic risk is one of financial 
regulation mistakenly conveys the impression that defective corporate governance 
had no part to play in the financial crisis. Indeed, the root problem of excessive risk-
taking can be attributed to the behaviour of directors and shareholders, the 
controlling agents of the company. As Kirkpatrick explains, lapses in board 
oversight and risk management, not to mention remuneration structures which 
incentivized short-termism, were major contributing factors to the crisis.94 It follows 
 
 88. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation 23 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 113, 123 (2010).  
 89. Hansmann, supra note 38, at 442. 
 90. Gevurtz, supra note 88, at 123.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 125. 
 94. Grant Kirkpatrick, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (OCED 
Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 2009).   
TAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders 
186 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
that where failures in corporate governance contribute to systemic risk, corporate 
law must be re-calibrated to address these issues. 
Finally, acknowledging the necessity of financial regulation does not mean that 
corporate governance has no role to play – instead of being mutually exclusive, both 
regulatory regimes can be mutually reinforcing. Examples of such mutually-
reinforcing governance regimes proliferate all spheres of corporate activity, across 
many jurisdictions: public investors, for one, are usually protected from corporate 
exploitation by a dual regime of private enforcement devices (shareholder lawsuits 
for misrepresentations) as well as public enforcement (criminal sanctions or quasi-
criminal penalties).95 Specifically, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Young and 
Thyil have proposed a “holistic approach” which includes multiple and overlapping 
governance mechanisms: from firm-specific corporate codes of ethics which 
informally shape corporate culture; to the public corporate governance framework 
under national corporate governance codes or listing rules; and the outer layer of 
capital markets regulations which at the minimum promotes disclosure and reduces 
informational asymmetries, in order to facilitate the workings of a robust market 
for corporate control.96 The point to emphasize is that corporate governance law 
and financial or banking regulations are highly complementary tools – the former 
regulates opportunistic behaviour of corporate actors; while the latter is largely 
concerned with protecting firms’ asset cushions - yet both can work in tandem to 
safeguard the firm from potential failure and prevent it from posing risks to the 
system. 
4. Objection 3: Is the Goal of Protecting Systemic Stakeholders Over-broad and 
Unverifiable? 
Another objection to the idea that companies should take into account the interests 
of the economic system is that this goal is far too broad for corporate governance 
mechanisms to take into account, and accordingly, it would be difficult to verify if 
directors and shareholders are indeed acting in the interests of systemic 
stakeholders. For example, Kerr argues that taking the national economy’s interests 
into consideration goes far beyond the constituencies normally recognized as 
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, creditors, and the local community 
where business is located.97 It is hard to conceive of the idea of stakeholding 
extending to “the entire economic health of the nation.”98 
 
 95. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 294–298. 
 96. See Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 365. 
 97. Stakeholder Analysis,  THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ 
PoliticalEconomy/stakeholderanalysis.htm (last visited February 13, 2014). 
 98. J. E. Kerr, Note, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s Intervention: Much Needed Relief 
or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup and General 
Motors, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 108 (2011). 
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While this writer would acknowledge that taking the interests of the economy 
into account extends the paradigm of stakeholding considerably, it is argued that 
this paradigm is not over-broad to the extent that it becomes unverifiable. Firstly, it 
is re-emphasized that systemic stakeholders, whose “stake” lies in the fact of their 
exposure to systemic risk posed by the firm, do not include every conceivable 
stakeholder – it excludes, for example, competitors, the media, social activists, and 
the natural environment; constituencies that other stakeholder models routinely 
attempt to include.99 Indeed, Max Clarkson, the founder of the risk-based 
conception of stakeholding, himself recognized that “[s]takeholder theory should 
not be used to weave a basket big enough to hold the world’s misery.”100 
Furthermore, the protection of systemic stakeholders, while at first glance 
seemingly an unverifiable objective, is actually quite susceptible to concretization, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The key proxy for the protection of systemic 
stakeholders is the degree to which a company presents systemic risks to the 
economy. This can be measured by either a “too big to fail” or “too interconnected 
to fail” test: the former looks at an aggregate of factors including an institution’s 
size relative to the national or international marketplace, and market share 
concentration;101 while the latter looks at the likelihood of a medium-term negative 
impact to the larger economy of an institution’s failure to be able to continue its 
ongoing business, taking into account the institution’s activities and the economic 
multiplier of all other commercial activities dependent specifically on that 
institution.102 These are not just theoretical formulae that companies cannot apply – 
in fact, the “too interconnected to fail” test has been used both in the past and in 
the recent financial crisis by the US Federal Government in considering whether an 
institution should get bailout funding.103 It is contended that the same kind of 
analysis can be undertaken by companies themselves in calibrating their risk 
management and other corporate governance mechanisms. 
Indeed, in comparison with the objectives of other variants of stakeholder 
theory, minimizing systemic risk is far more tractable a goal. For example, taking a 
corporate social responsibility paradigm of stakeholder theory, the oft-cited goals of 
ensuring “ethical conduct” and “ecologically-responsible conduct” have to be 
measured on multiple dimensions – this makes the pursuit and verification of 
objectives a lot more intractable in comparison with systemic risk, which can to 
some extent be measured by quantitative metrics.104 As Eddy Wymeersch, the 
 
 99. ROBERT PHILLIPS, STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 119 –134 (2003). 
 100. Id. at 119. 
 101. Josh Rothman, Too Connected to Fail, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2012, 02:09 PM) http://www.boston 
.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2012/08/too_connected_t.html. 
 102. Systemic Risk Defined, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, www.pciaa.net/reg-reform 
(last visited Jan. 2014). 
 103. Id.   
 104. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 119 (2010). 
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former Chairman of the Committee of European Securities Regulators, observes: 
“The financial stability objective [of corporate governance] is less elusive than e.g. 
[sic] social corporate responsibility.”105 Thus the apparent breadth and 
unverifiability of the systemic stakeholder objective is less of a problem than 
commonly perceived. 
5. Objection 4: Does the Systemic Stakeholder Model Imply that Shareholder Value 
Should Not Be Maximized At All? 
Some may contend that stakeholder models are completely incompatible with 
shareholder value maximization, and that any decisions taken in favour of 
stakeholders will necessarily be damaging to the company’s (and not just the 
shareholders’) interests. For example, Milton Friedman champions the view that if 
directors elect to keep open a plant to protect the interests of employees and the 
local community when the plant is consistently making a loss, then the plant would 
be forced to shut down in the long-term.106 
It is argued that the systemic stakeholder paradigm is fully compatible with the 
long-term value of the company. The systemic stakeholder paradigm, rather than 
mutually excluding shareholder value maximization altogether, does take into 
account the interests of shareholders.107 For example, one variation of stakeholder 
theory, the enlightened value maximization paradigm, accepts that the company 
should be governed in the interests of all stakeholders; but that long-term 
shareholder value maximization provides a good proxy for the goal of protecting all 
stakeholders.108 Under this version of stakeholder theory, the interests of 
shareholders and the wider community of stakeholders are not mutually exclusive: 
pursuing the long-term value of the company necessarily implies protecting the 
sustainability of enterprise. Thus, this would require that corporate governance 
takes into account any risks that the company may be imposing on the wider 
financial and economic system, which would threaten both the convergent interests 
of the company and the economic community that it is dependent on for long-term 
survival.109 Ultimately, while pure shareholder primacy focuses on the interests of 
shareholders alone, the systemic stakeholder view takes into account both 
 
 105. E. Wynmeersch, Corporate Governance and Financial Stability at 3, (Financial Law Institute Working 
Paper 2008-2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1288631. 
 106. M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Sep. 13, 1970, at 33; (cited in D. KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT, 339-340).  (Oxford Uni. Pres., 
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 107. V.H. Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder 
Divide at 62, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476116 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
 108. M. Jensen, Value Maximization Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 297, 299 (2001). 
 109. See Gevurtz, supra note 88, at 151, 154. 
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shareholders and other stakeholders in the system, and attempts to integrate their 
interests holistically. 
II. Deficiencies in the Means of Corporate Governance - The 
Failure of the Board of Directors and Shareholders to Protect 
Systemic Stakeholders and their Causal Links to the Financial Crisis 
Building on Part I, in lieu of the conclusion that the purpose of corporate 
governance is to serve both shareholders as well as the interests of the financial 
system and wider economy, the discussion proceeds to analyze how well the key 
means of corporate governance – the board of directors and shareholders – has 
functioned in achieving this objective. It is contended that both the board and 
shareholders have failed in protecting systemic stakeholders, and that this failure to 
guard against systemic risks precipitated the crisis. The balance of this section 
proceeds as follows: Part II.A briefly discusses the role of corporate governance in 
the crisis from a general angle; II.B – II.D discuss the particular failings of the board 
of directors – categorizing them under the headings of defective composition, 
structures, and duties; and II.E discusses the particular role of shareholders in 
facilitating poor corporate governance. The perspective taken is that of Anglo-
American corporate governance, given that the US and UK were the focal points of 
the financial crisis. 
A. The Role of Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisis 
On one view, corporate governance demonstrated no deficiencies; nor was it 
causative of the 2009 financial crisis. This is the position adopted by Cheffins, who 
argues that corporate governance has improved significantly in the last decade, with 
many financial firms demonstrating indicators of good governance – boards with 
high numbers of independent directors, the establishment of risk and audit 
committees, and greater shareholder involvement in corporate activities.110 
The opposing view, supported by this writer, counters Cheffins by arguing that 
there has been a more “fundamental systemic failure” of corporate governance111 - 
such that what is traditionally seen as indicators of good governance, such as 
independent boards or shareholder empowerment, are in fact the wrong means of 
guarding against risks to the system. As the discussion proceeds to demonstrate, 
much of our conventional wisdom regarding director independence, board 
diversity, risk management structures and board duties is misconceived or overly 
myopic; in assuming that governance mechanisms designed to protect shareholders 
 
 110. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance Fail During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? 
The Case of the S&P 500, BUS. LAW. Vol. 65, No. 1. 
 111. SUN, STEWART & POLLARD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 4–6, (Cambridge U. Press 2011). 
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from managerial agency costs work equally well in guarding against risks to 
systemic stakeholders. Consequently, this lack of foresight contributed to poor 
corporate governance which precipitated the financial crisis. 
B. Deficiencies in Board Composition: Sacrificing Competence for Independence and 
a Lack of Diversity 
1. Sacrificing Competence for Independence 
The board of directors is traditionally understood to straddle a dual function: to 
manage the company as well as to monitor the performance of executives.112 In the 
US, the Section 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provides 
that the business and affairs of the corporation are to be managed under the 
direction of the board;113 while Art. 3 of the UK Model Articles of Association for 
Public and Private Companies provides that the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company’s business.114 At the same time, it is a truism that the 
board is not obliged to run the company on a day-to-day basis and instead takes a 
supervisory role most of the time by establishing plans and monitoring 
performance.115 
However, due to the need to ensure un-conflicted supervision of executives, 
Anglo-American corporate governance law has shown a steady trend towards 
emphasizing the monitoring role of directors, reflected in an increasing focus on 
having qualitatively higher standards for independence and quantitatively more 
independent directors on boards and committees.116 It is partly due to this over-
emphasis on independence that the need for financial expertise was relegated to a 
secondary priority, thus weakening the ability of boards to understand the financial 
difficulties their companies were mired in during the run-up to the crisis.117 
To elaborate, the impetus towards independence accelerated in the early 2000s, 
following the Enron and WorldCom scandals, which demonstrated that previous 
requirements for independence were insufficiently stringent or detailed. For 
example, as Elson points out, despite the fact that Enron had 13 formally 
independent non-executive directors on a board of 15 members, various 
relationships between these directors and the company rendered their alleged 
independence more of a facade; such as long tenures (more than 15 years), and 
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 117. See Merson, supra note 84, at 22 (“In a report published in September 2008, the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants wrote. . .[t]he use of overly compex financial products, which thwarted 
effective supervisory control, and the unethical advancement, at the point of sale, of loans to people with little 
realistic hope of repaying them shows a lack of basic corporate governance.”). 
Tan (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Zhong Xing Tan 
Vol. 9, No. 2 2014 191 
substantial fees (over US $350,000 per year worth of stock options), which caused 
directors to become more acquiescent to management.118 As the US Congressional 
Hearings preceding the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) found, these 
directors of scandal-ridden companies had “extensive social and professional ties 
with corporate officers and their fellow directors that compromised their ability to 
be impartial and undermined their ability to provide an adequate check on 
directors.”119 
In response, Anglo-American corporate governance standards of independence 
were raised. Firstly, the required number of independent directors on boards and 
board committees was increased. For example, SOX required the NYSE Listing 
Rules to provide for a majority of independent directors on the board and an audit 
committee comprising solely of independent directors.120 Secondly, the definition of 
independence was given more rigour to foreclose opportunities for conflicts of 
interest to arise. The 2003 UK Higgs Report on “The Role and Effectiveness of Non-
Executive Directors” took to task the earlier definition of “independence” in the 
1998 UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance, criticizing it for being 
insufficiently specific.121 Thus it further supplemented the definition of 
independence by specifying various relationships and circumstances which would 
compromise independence, including, inter alia: material business relationships; 
status as a former employee (within 5 years of terminating employment); the 
receipt of any sort of remuneration apart from a director’s fee; and holding cross-
directorships or having significant links with other directors through involvement 
in other organizations.122 
This increasing focus on independence – a knee-jerk response to corporate 
scandals, was actually creating a long-term problem that would manifest itself in the 
financial crisis. The problem, as stated by Kershaw, is that of the “independence-
knowledge trade-off”;123 the broader the definition of independence, the more 
difficult it becomes to find individuals who are willing to serve on the board and 
who have a firm understanding of the company and its industry. While 
independent non-executive directors ensure un-conflicted monitoring, they do not 
necessarily ensure informed management or even effective oversight (since they may 
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lack understanding of the company to the point where they do not know how to 
look out for “red flags”).124 As Kershaw observes, a “broad definition of 
independence effectively takes a risk that the pool of advisory talent will continue to 
be deep enough”125 – a poor gamble, as illustrated by the 2009 crisis. 
In the context of the financial crisis, the problem was that stringent definitions of 
independence made it difficult for financial institutions to find independent 
directors who had sufficiently deep expertise in the industry, since the relevant pool 
of experts with such financial knowledge is naturally concentrated and limited to 
those who have had employment experience in the industry – so-called “insiders.”126 
A report by Guerra and Thal-Larsen127 quotes headhunters as stating that “one of 
the unintended consequences of SOX is that its emphasis on independence rules 
out from board positions a lot of people who knew about this [financial] 
business.”128 This translated into many of the boards of crisis-hit financial 
institutions having insufficient expertise: Kirkpatrick notes that at eight US major 
financial institutions, two-thirds of directors had no banking experience, yet were 
sitting on highly technical board committees covering audit and risk - precisely due 
to the independence requirements.129 In the same vein, Sharpe points out that the 
board members of Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, although having prestigious 
degrees and other qualifications, lacked meaningful accounting and financial 
expertise to effectively monitor the activities of investment banks.130 
To compound the problem, it was not just the case that stringent definitions of 
“independence” in the listing rules and corporate governance codes naturally 
excluded competent individuals; it was that the need for independence became the 
touchstone of good governance such that “the emphasis on objective indicia of 
conflicts dominated the selection process to the exclusion of the indicia of basic 
competence and good judgment.”131 As US-based empirical studies demonstrate, 
companies increasingly began to focus on negative checklists of conflicts, relegating 
positive lists of qualifications to secondary importance, in choosing board 
members.132 As Bainbridge puts it, independence became a “fetish” in itself133 - 
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resulting in a lack of knowledge just as dangerous to corporate health as the conflict 
of interest problems in the previous wave of corporate scandals.134 
While this imbalance between independence and competence can be attributed 
to Anglo-American corporate governance as a whole, it may be qualified that the 
problem is less acute in the UK context. Based on Grant Thorton’s research findings 
commissioned by the FRC,135 the latter concluded that sectoral experience and 
industry-related experience amongst directors on the boards of a selection of FTSE 
350 companies had increased by about 7% from 2002 onwards (the year before the 
independence provisions were introduced), thus suggesting no loss of competence 
as a result of the more rigorous independence requirements.136 With due respect to 
the Thorton review, one may argue that these findings are inconclusive: 
competence could arguably have increased even more had there been no over-
emphasis on independence. Further, looking at the absolute figures, even with the 
increase, sectoral experience and industry experience were 30% and 59% 
respectively, numbers which do not inspire much confidence in the ability of the 
board to effectively monitor and manage large complex companies.137 Nonetheless, 
it is possible that competency problems are less acute in the UK as compared with 
the US, given that the majority of criticisms stem from US commentary. 
2. Lack of Diversity and Problems of “Group-think” 
Notwithstanding the over-emphasis on formal criteria for independence, the 
objectivity of the board has yet been compromised by a lack of diversity and more 
subtle behavioural dynamics which undermine effective independent judgement by 
individual directors who may meet all the stringent requirements for independence. 
In a thought-provoking report entitled “Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case 
of US Subprime Lenders,”138 Maureen Muller-Kahle and Krista Lewellyn find that 
firms in the in financial industry which had less gender-diverse boards were prone 
to greater subprime lending and excessive risk-taking, based on survey of 74 US-
based publically-traded firms over a nine-year period.139 
The lack of women points toward a more fundamental flaw in boardroom 
composition – a lack of diversity which can exacerbate problems of “group-
think.”140 “Group-think” refers to a collective cognitive bias which impedes the 
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effectiveness of deliberative, group decision-making processes.141 As Johnson notes, 
group-think can lead boards of directors in systemically significant financial 
institutions to “perilous consequences, including enterprise risk management 
failures, insolvency, or market disruption.”142 
One specific example of group-think is what behavioural economists call 
“structural bias” – a cognitive problem which impedes a director’s ability to exercise 
objective judgment in circumstances which involve persons with whom the director 
has relational ties.143 Since board members are generally selected from a small pool 
of candidates who often participate in similar educational and professional circles, 
sharing many affiliations – what some commentators have termed an “old boys’ 
network”144 – it is often the case that these relational ties cause individual directors 
to abandon their perceptions regarding a particular issue and adopt an opinion that 
reflects the group consensus, rather than engage in rigorous debate to generate the 
benefits of deliberative decision-making.145 
These problems of group-think are compounded by the lack of women in the 
boardroom. Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe report that only 15% of Fortune 500 
boards have a woman on the board.146 In the FTSE 250, the percentage of female 
non-executive directors fell from 9% in 2007 to 8.7% in 2008, part of a consistently 
low historic trend of female participation in the boardroom.147 Branson’s recent 
2011 global survey on female directors reveals that this is a ubiquitous problem 
across many jurisdictions: while the overall European average is 11.7% female 
representation, Germany reports 7% (on supervisory, and not managing, boards), 
while the US stands at 15.2%.148  The state of female participation is not much better 
in the Asia-Pacific: Australia leads with 10.6%, while New Zealand follows with 
9.3%, and Hong Kong at 8.9%.149 While it would certainly stretch logic to attribute 
the financial crisis to the lack of female directors, the financial crisis can be said to 
have highlighted a deeper root problem in board composition – a lack of diversity, 
and accordingly, objective judgment in the dynamics of group decision-making. 
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C. Deficiencies in Board Structure: Lack of Risk Management Structures, Un-
integrated Approaches and Informational Deficiencies 
1. The Lack of Risk Management Structures 
Risk management refers to the process by which the board of directors defines a 
company’s strategies and objectives so as to strike an optimal balance between 
growth and related risks.150 Such risks include operational risks – risks of faulty 
controls, fraud and human error; market risks – risks in the trading books of debt 
and equity instruments linked to changes in the market; and credit risk – risk that a 
change in the credit quality of a counterparty would affect the firm’s own value.151 It 
is important to stress the interconnection of these risks to systemic risk: in simple 
terms, the more a firm is exposed to operational, market and credit risk; and the 
larger and more interconnected it gets, the more the firm poses a risk to the entire 
financial system and economy if its operational, market or credit risks materialize in 
ways that adversely affect the firm. Risk management thus seeks to detect, assess and 
respond to such risks by avoidance (refraining from certain risk-laden 
transactions), transferring risk through hedging, or mitigating risks through 
responsive control measures.152 
There is no question that risk management by boards was insufficiently robust 
and a major contributor to the financial crisis. For example, a 2008 Towers Perrin 
survey of CFOs reveals that 72% of surveyed companies had under-developed risk 
management processes, and 62% considered poor risk management to be a major 
contributor to the financial crisis – attributing even more blame to boards’ risk 
management failures than the inherent complexity of financial products (which 
55% of respondents considered the major factor).153 
Where exactly lay the fractures in risk management systems? Certainly, while risk 
models and stress testing failed due to mistaken technical assumptions, there exists 
a more pervasive corporate governance dimension in the failures of risk 
management.154 Firstly, many firms involved in the 2009 financial crisis had poor 
risk management structures. Several commentators have pointed out how previous 
reforms such as SOX-mandated internal controls focussed primarily on financial 
reporting and disclosures, for example SOX S.302 which provides for CEO and 
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CFO certification of the accuracy of annual and quarterly reports.155 Consequently, 
companies missed the forest for the trees – failing to recognize that such internal 
controls were but a subset of risk management in the broader context.156 
Furthermore, the structure of Anglo-American board committees tends to place 
risk management under the jurisdiction of the audit committee, which as Fanto 
observes may have been over-worked in the light of its pre-existing compliance 
requirements.157 Thus board structures did not place sufficient emphasis on proper 
risk detection and monitoring. 
2. Un-integrated Risk Management 
Secondly, even with such board structures, some firms demonstrated a deeper 
problem of un-integrated and un-embedded risk management. To put it another 
way, many firms took a “silo”, as opposed to comprehensive and coordinated, 
approach to risk management.158 Harner gives the example of UBS, where each 
group within the organizational structure did have a given role to play in the risk 
management process, but the board failed to coordinate or monitor the groups.159 
The division of tasks – for example between CRO, CFO and corporate counsel, was 
meant to facilitate division of labour and specialization, but instead resulted in a 
segregated approach to risk management where no one, in particular the board 
charged with the responsibility of oversight, had sufficient understanding of the 
company’s total risk exposure.160 These deficiencies demonstrate that merely putting 
in place risk committees and CROs may not sufficiently address the need for firm-
wide integrated risk management. 
3. Structural Holes in Information Transmission and Processing 
Additionally, one major reason for the lack of an integrated risk management 
system is the absence of upward information flows. In Pirson and Turnbull’s 
analysis, the problem lies with the hierarchical structure of the board.161 The 
argument is that while risks originate in one part of the organization lower down 
the corporate hierarchy (such as the sales department), the actual management of 
the risks is to be carried out by another part further up the chain of command – the 
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board of directors.162 One commonplace example of this informational dynamic is 
the party game of “telephone”, which illustrates how the meaning of a message can 
get very confused after being related through a chain of individuals. Pirson and 
Turnbull assert that, based on a theoretical model of 50% accuracy retention, 
information conveyed from workers through the mid-level and senior management 
can ultimately lose over 90% of its original content by the time it reaches the board 
of directors.163 While these arguments may seem to rest too heavily on theory, the 
authors do point to significant informational failures during the financial crisis to 
buttress their case: for example, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy report highlights 
that the board was unaware of several critical pieces of information regarding the 
firm’s dire risk position, such as the fact that several high-risk bridge equity deals 
had been excluded from Lehman’s risk appetite usage calculations, which would 
have taken it over its risk appetite limit in 2007.164 Also, several employees down the 
corporate hierarchy were known to have reported their concerns over excessive 
risk-taking to senior managers and the external auditors, though these reports were 
not made available to the board.165 As such, it is asserted that “communication 
failure is more likely the principal cause of the crisis.”166 
Pirson and Turnbull’s argument parallels another earlier analysis – Lawrence 
Mitchell’s theory of structural holes and informational monopolies.167 According to 
Mitchell, the board faces a fundamental structural problem: given that corporate 
personnel are organized into distinct networks with no ties, the actor who can 
bridge two distinct networks can attain control over the flow of information.168 
Thus, because the board consists primarily of outside directors with no networks in 
the firm, it becomes open to the CEO to bridge this “structural gap” and exploit it 
to his advantage.169 Mitchell cites the example of Enron to demonstrate how Skilling 
exploited the structural gap between the outside directors of the board and 
employees further down the corporate chain to stem any possibility of negative 
information being transmitted upward.170 Mitchell’s analysis adds another 
dimension to Pirson and Turnbull’s, by suggesting how information may not only 
be lost inadvertently going up the corporate ladder, but also deliberately where 
strong CEOs desire to opportunistically restrict the flow of information to the 
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board.171 Indeed, Mitchell’s analysis is directly relevant to the financial crisis. One 
egregious example is that of the former Lehman CFO, Chris O’Meara, who did not 
want the board to know that Lehman was approaching the firm-wide risk appetite 
limit, as the analysis by his subordinates demonstrated.172 Thus he removed the limit 
from the standard chart presented to the board, a clear illustration of an actor 
exploiting an informational gap.173 Accordingly, these analyses suggest that 
hierarchical boards may not be in the best position to receive and process 
information pertaining to firm risks. 
D. Deficiencies in Board Duties: Insufficient Liability for Oversight Failures 
The problem of defective risk management is exacerbated by an enervated duty of 
care in the field of risk monitoring, a problem especially pertinent in US case law. It 
is evident that “[p]otential legal liability also influences corporate conduct.”174 Thus, 
in addition to poorly-designed board structures, a lack of legal liability for directors 
can be said to have facilitated board failures of oversight in risk management. It 
must be emphasized that the duty of care that is in question here is not that of 
decision-making (which involves commercial judgments and is in appropriate cases 
protected by the business judgement rule which precludes hindsight review of 
directors’ actions); but rather the duty of monitoring – that of ensuring that the 
company has the necessary systems in place to ensure accurate and timely 
information, and to respond accordingly when these systems show “red flags.”175 
In what particular way is the architecture of this duty of monitoring deficient? 
The key problem in American jurisprudence is that the Delaware courts have 
presently excluded oversight responsibility for business risks from the scope of a 
director’s duty of care, as held in Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
(Citigroup).176 According to the Citigroup court, while directors do have a general 
duty of monitoring, which cover legal risks such as fraud; this duty does not extend 
to managing commercial (for example, credit, market, operational and systemic) 
risks.177 
This unduly narrow duty of monitoring fails to safeguard against excessive 
corporate risk-taking which threatens systemic stability. For example, in Citigroup, 
the financial firm’s directors were not held personally liable to ensure that systems 
were in place to manage Citigroup’s risk to the subprime mortgage market – though 
it was clear that Citigroup’s marketing of collaterized debt obligations (CDOs), a 
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form of derivate security consisting of repackaged pools of lower rated securities, 
heavily exposed Citigroup to market, credit and operational risk in the region of 
US$55 billion.178 Given Citigroup’s systemic importance, the risks to the firm meant 
that systemic interests were implicated as well.179 
Further, as Bainbridge points out, the distinction between risk management and 
legal compliance is not entirely sustainable, since the latter is but a subset of the 
former.180 As stated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), compliance with regulations is one of four broad categories 
of enterprise risk management, along with effective use of resources, reliable 
disclosures and pursuit of strategic goals.181 For example, the WorldCom accounting 
fraud, which involved losses of US$11 billion, may be seen as a failure of accounting 
controls as well as a broader failure of operational risk management – part of the 
board’s wider duties to manage enterprise risk of all forms.182 Thus, the 
unprincipled line-drawing by US courts between legal compliance and commercial 
risk management in the delineation of directors’ duties of monitoring represents 
another instance of corporate governance’s failure to protect the system from 
excessive risk-taking by the company. 
E. Abdication of Shareholders’ Responsibilities 
As suggested above,183 institutional shareholders had a key role to play in facilitating 
the financial crisis. In fact, a very recent study by Erkens, Hung and Matos184 based 
on a dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries at the centre of the crisis 
demonstrates that firms with higher institutional ownership experienced worse 
stock returns during the crisis period because institutional shareholders encouraged 
more risk-taking.185 This risk-taking is accompanied by short-termist strategies 
which are not conducive to long-term corporate growth – for example, hedge funds 
often attempt to drive up short-term earnings at the expense of long-term results by 
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cutting research and development, or moving revenues from future periods into 
current accounting periods.186 
The short-termist strategy is justified on the dubious economic theory of the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, which asserts that stock prices accurately 
capture the fundamental economic values of companies and that any increase in 
stock price must reflect an equivalent increase in value, whether in the short or 
long-term.187 In reality, the premises of this theory are highly questionable – it 
assumes that investors have all relevant information about the long-term value of a 
firm, an assumption that rarely plays out in reality. For example, in the context of 
the financial crisis, investors did not have complete appreciation of the probability 
of the housing market crash, given that the risk of such an outcome was an 
“unknown unknown” – a high impact, rare-event risk.188 Thus, the corporate values 
of many financial firms were in reality over-inflated due to the “irrational 
exuberance” of institutional investors caught up in the euphoria of the housing 
bubble, while not taking into account the longer-term risks to the company and the 
financial system.189 
The excessively risky and short-termist corporate strategies encouraged by 
institutional shareholders represent a clear defect in the architecture of corporate 
governance. Specifically, they suggest that institutional shareholders do not 
appreciate that their position of influence in companies entails responsibilities as 
well as rights.190 Such responsibilities were emphasized in UK Corporate 
Governance as early as 1992, in the widely-respected Cadbury Report which 
identified institutional shareholders as having fundamentally important power, 
given the weight of their votes, to influence the standards of corporate 
governance.191 Similarly, the UK National Association of Pension Funds has 
previously articulated that “share ownership also gives rise to governance 
responsibilities. . .directed towards the enhancement of long-term shareholder 
value and the wider economic benefits which this should also engender.”192 The 
long-standing failure of institutional investors to take these pronouncements into 
account thus facilitated excessive risk-taking at the cost to the economy. 
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III. Reforming Corporate Governance – Re-conceptualising the 
Roles and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and 
Shareholders 
A. The Underlying Principle of Reform: Both Directors and Shareholders as 
“Stewards for Systemic Stakeholders” 
Given the aforementioned problems of defective board composition, structures and 
duties, and shareholder irresponsibility, it is submitted that reforms are in order. It 
is argued that the corporate governance paradigm underlying these reforms is that 
of stewardship for the system as a stakeholder in the company – that is, both directors 
and shareholders have responsibilities to play in governing the company, not only 
for its internal stakeholders but its external socio-economic stakeholders as well. 
Currently, there exists an ongoing debate on the correct means of corporate 
governance between those who take a “director primacy” and those who take a 
“shareholder empowerment” view.193 Those in the former camp take the position 
that shareholders lack incentives to gather information necessary to participate 
actively in decision making and rational shareholders would be apathetic given that 
the opportunity cost of making informed decisions is significant – hence the need 
for the board of directors as a centralized decision-making body.194 The latter 
“shareholder empowerment view” emphasizes that the directors often shirk or self-
deal, such that shareholder involvement is necessary to constrain such agency 
costs.195 
The problem with this debate is that it has started from the premise that 
maximizing shareholder value is the ends of the company and consequently, 
narrowed the means of corporate governance into a binary, mutually-exclusive fix – 
either directors or shareholders should govern the company. This unhelpful debate 
can be transcended once we see that the ends of the company include other 
stakeholders, in particular the interests of the economy and financial system. 
Accordingly, the roles of board of directors and shareholders can be re-
conceptualized to meet these ends in a way that involves both enhancing the board 
and also giving shareholders responsibilities in the governance of the company. At 
the conceptual level, I suggest that both directors and shareholders can be seen as 
“stewards”. The role of directors as stewards draws from Donaldson and Davis’ 
work which emphasizes the benefits of facilitative authority structures.196 This has 
also been reflected in UK corporate governance to some extent – the Cadbury 
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Report expressly describes directors as having “stewardship” responsibilities.197 On 
the other hand, influential shareholders, in particular institutional shareholders, are 
increasingly been seen as stewards as well – as the non-profit think tank 
Tomorrow’s Company notes, institutional shareholders may be viewed as 
“universal owner[s who] own[s] a small[,] but representative fraction of most of the 
companies in an economy, [hence] their ability to satisfy their fiduciary duties 
depend on the economy’s overall efficiency and performance.”198 Thus, institutional 
shareholders have responsibilities vis a vis the wider economy as well. Indeed, the 
UK FRC has recently implemented a “Stewardship Code” for institutional investors, 
highlighting the need for their accountability to all corporate stakeholders.199 It is 
submitted that the convergence of this “stewardship” label for directors and 
institutional shareholders is not merely coincidental – rather, it reflects a slowly 
growing consensus that both directors and shareholders have responsibilities to the 
sustenance of long-term corporate value and the interests of the wider economy. 
The balance of this section proceeds by examining how board composition, 
structures and duties, as well as shareholders’ responsibilities, can be enhanced to 
safeguard against systemic risks. Where relevant, I examine some of the steps taken 
by the UK and US in response to the financial crisis, to determine if they effectively 
remedy the defects in corporate governance which contributed to the financial 
crisis. Where insufficient, I suggest additional measures, including observations on 
their viability. 
B. Re-composing the Board: 
1. Striking the Right Balance Between Competence and Independence 
In the US, the primary reform vehicle, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, does not tackle the problem of excessive focus on 
independence in any way.200 In contrast, the UK has been more proactive in this 
respect, addressing this issue in its 2009 Review of the Combined Code.201 However, 
the UK Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) response was limited to including a 
new provision stating that: “The board and its committees should have the 
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the 
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company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities 
effectively.”202 
This response, while having the correct intention to ensure the balance between 
competence and independence, does not strike this writer as a particularly robust 
reform. It does not give any guidance on the definition of an “appropriate balance”, 
without which compliance cannot be ascertained. Thus there would not even be 
anything to comply with or explain away; further diluting the already muted 
enforcement regime in the UK context, which relies on private “comply or explain” 
enforcement rather than the threat of de-listing or regulatory sanctions for non-
compliance.203 
How then should the competence factor be enhanced? It is proposed that the UK 
could go one step further in its 2010 Corporate Governance Code by annexing a list 
of “best practice” competence indicia from various industries, to provide some 
measure of guidance for directors. These industry-specific criteria can be readily 
found in guidelines provided by industry regulators, but are seldom reflected in 
national corporate governance codes which state competence requirements at too 
high a level of generality. For example, in response to the financial crisis, financial 
regulators of various countries such as the Irish Central bank have increased “fitness 
and probity” standards for board members of financial institutions.204 These 
standards are still general enough to reflect the diversity of financial firms, but 
provide more guidance given the particular needs of the financial industry. Drawing 
from this experience, it is suggested that corporate governance regulators could 
collect these guidelines or best practice indicia from various industries and annex 
them as a reference to the relevant code provision on board composition, perhaps 
in a tabulated manner so as to compare competency requirements across industries. 
Again, it is important to emphasize that this proposal does not mean to promote a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to industry-specific corporate governance – for 
example, within an “experience” criterion for competency, a range of years could be 
specified which differs from industry to industry. At the same time, it is meant to 
provide clearer guidance for prospective directors. Also, by incorporating these best 
practice guidelines into the corporate governance code instead of leaving them as 
legally-unenforceable industry-specific suggestions, these guidelines at least become 
backed by the UK “comply or explain” regime, ensuring greater corporate 
accountability for boardroom competency.205 The US, given that its regime relies on 
mandatory NYSE listing rules, may find that mandating competency requirements 
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under the threat of de-listing constitutes too heavy-handed an approach. Thus, it 
could adapt this proposal to suit its particular regime, for example issuing such 
competency guidelines from the NYSE as non-binding suggestions, rather than 
incorporate them into their mandatory listing rules. This would at least emphasize 
the need for greater industry-specific competency, a problem which has been over-
looked until the outbreak of the recent crisis.   
2. Introducing Diversity and Objective Judgment into the Boardroom 
To counter the problems of group-think, the solution should not just be to increase 
formalistic criteria for “independent” directors – firstly, this would exacerbate 
problems of insufficient competency as discussed above; and secondly, this would 
not improve the psychological and cognitive dynamics of the boardroom. One 
solution is to focus on increasing diversity as a measure of better deliberative 
decision-making in group settings. In diversifying boards, one of the more pressing 
concerns relates to the lack of female directors. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that increasing female participation in the boardroom can meet the 
need for “cognitive conflict” in group decision-making, viz, task-oriented 
differences in judgment that can generate discussion and improve the quality of 
decisions.206 For example, a 2007 McKinsey survey revealed that companies with a 
higher proportion of women on their management committees were 47% more 
profitable.207 
To enhance gender diversity on boards, one can take a softer approach by 
recommending the need for a more balanced gender mix on boards; or a more 
stringent approach which actually mandates quotas for female participation. The 
former approach is adopted by the UK FRC in its 2009 Review of the Combined 
Code, which recognized the benefits of gender diversity in reducing group-think 
and thus amended its supporting principles regarding appointments (B.2 of the 
current UK Corporate Governance Code) to state that: “The search for board 
candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against 
objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, 
including gender” [emphasis mine].208 The second method of introducing quotas for 
female participation is being actively considered by the European Parliament. In 
fact, the EU Parliament has, in July 2011, already given EU businesses an ultimatum 
to voluntarily increase female participation from the current 10% to 30% by 2015, 
with the ultimate objective of achieving 40% female representation by 2020 on the 
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boards of large EU listed companies.209 If the voluntary measures fail to have 
substantial effect by 2012, the EU Parliament would table legislation to introduce a 
mandatory quota of 40% female participation.210 
Comparing the two approaches, this writer finds the softer approach preferable. 
I echo the UK FRC’s concern that the quota-based method of introducing diversity 
is too prescriptive211 – it fails to give sufficient leeway for an individual firm’s 
makeup, for example where the firm requires more financially-competent directors, 
who so happen to be male. The kind of “quick-fix” solution promulgated by the EU 
Parliament may also cause problems in transition – either requiring that boards 
increase their numbers to include more women; or substitute current male 
members with more women. In either case, the solution would dramatically alter 
board composition in too precipitate a fashion, and may sacrifice experienced male 
members at the altar of a new obsession with “diversity”. Furthermore, as Branson 
points out, quota laws may result in female executives becoming “fast-tracked”, 
such that boardrooms would end up being populated by unqualified and figurehead 
female directors – a solution which militates against the true spirit of diversity, 
which is to include meaningful opposing perspectives.212 
Thus, it is suggested that the need for diversity be introduced into corporate 
governance codes as an aspirational provision, with corporate governance 
regulators giving guidelines of a target level of participation within a specified time 
frame – but without being backed by the threat of a mandatory quota. Another 
variation of the “soft” approach which may have slightly more “teeth” is the use of 
“certificate and pledge programs”. These pledges, which require public companies 
to add women to their boards if they have voluntarily subscribed to the pledge, have 
proven to be quite effective: as Branson highlights, 110 of the largest Dutch 
companies (including Shell, Phillips, and Heineken) have signed up and followed 
through the pledges, contributing to an increase in female board representation 
from approximately 7% in 2006 to 20.9% in 2010.213 The key factor for the success 
of these pledge programs rests on firms’ reputational capital, which incentivizes 
their participation (for example, major Dutch companies would not want to be seen 
publically as being discriminatory), and also compels their implementation of the 
promised level of female representation. At the same time, the pledge system is far 
less onerous than a quota system – thus it may be a useful “mid-way” solution 
 
 209. Valentina Pop, EU parliament backs female quotas for top corporate jobs, EU OBSERVER (July 7, 2011, 
9:25 AM), http://euobserver.com/institutional/32598. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Feedback Statement: Gender Diversity on Boards, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, 4 (Oct. 2011), https://www. 
frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Feedback-Statement-Gender-Diversity-on-boards. 
aspx. 
 212. Branson, supra note 154, at 9. 
 213. Id. at 10–11. 
TAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders 
206 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
between mandatory female representation and unenforceable aspirational 
standards. 
C. Re-structuring the Board: New Board Structures and Network Governance to 
Facilitate Integrated Risk Management 
Given the problems of structural deficiencies, informational loopholes and un-
integrated risk management, the regulatory response has not been particularly 
strong. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates the creation of board-level risk 
management committees, but only for publicly-traded bank holding companies and 
those non-bank financial services companies supervised by the Federal Reserve.214 
As Bainbridge observes: “The federal forbearance reflected in these modest 
developments is rather surprising given the significant role of risk management 
failures in the crisis.”215 The UK’s response has been almost similar: the FRC has 
likewise refrained from suggesting the establishment of board risk committees for 
all companies, limiting them to financial institutions (as originally suggested in the 
2009 Walker Review).216 Instead, for all companies, the FRC has inserted a very 
general provision in the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code emphasizing the risk 
management responsibilities of the board (C.2),217 supplemented by a requirement 
to conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of all risk management controls 
(C.2.1).218 
The limitation of risk management committees to financial firms is flawed 
insofar as it fails to recognize that risk management issues arise routinely at non-
financial companies, which if sufficiently large or interconnected, can pose a risk to 
the economic system as well. Kirkpatrick highlights the fact that risk management is 
not unique to financial companies, citing the 2006 example of Airbus which 
invested massively in developing the A380 aircraft, a project which involved 
substantial exchange rate risk and significant payments to customers in the event of 
late delivery.219 Airbus’ board under-estimated these risks and failed to manage 
them, such that when significant production delays materialized, Airbus’ directors 
were taken by surprise.220 Hence, simply requiring boards of non-financial 
 
 214. Peter O. Mülbert & Ryan D. Citlau, The Uncertain Role of Banks’ Corp. Governance in Systemic Risk 
Regulation, UNIV. OF MAINZ – CTR. FOR GERMAN AND INT’L LAW OF FIN. SERVS. AND FACULTY, 24 (July 14, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1885866. 
 215. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 176. 
 216. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 86. 
 217. See Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 202, at 18 (“The board is responsible for determining the nature 
and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should 
maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.”). 
 218. See id. (“The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s risk 
management and internal control systems and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review 
should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.”). 
 219. Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 76. 
 220. Id.  
Tan (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  5:11 PM 
 Zhong Xing Tan 
Vol. 9, No. 2 2014 207 
companies to implement and review risk management processes, without at least 
requiring a minimum core of basic structures, is insufficient. Furthermore, these 
reforms fail to tackle head-on the deeper issues of informational loopholes and un-
integrated risk management. 
Thus, this writer proposes reforms at two levels: i) the inclusion at the 
minimum, of separate risk committees chaired by independent CROs, and ii) more 
far-reaching reforms involving new structures of “network governance”, to increase 
information flows throughout the firm and facilitate the integration of firm-wide 
risk management. 
The inclusion of separate risk committees chaired by independent CROs can 
make a significant difference in firm performance during crises – as the report of 
the internationally-constituted Senior Supervisor’s Group shows, firms that fared 
best during the crisis were the ones with board oversight of risk in the form of a 
high-level committee, which served as a locus for firm-wide monitoring of risks.221 
Other empirical studies on the financial crisis have also concurred on the need for 
CROs – for example, Bolton found that firms with a CRO enjoyed higher 
profitability and suffered fewer loan losses during the crisis.222 A further step may 
even involve the recruitment of outside risk-management experts to provide 
independent reviews of the adequacy of a firm’s risk-management practices, in the 
same way that the audit committee relies on outside accounting firms to review the 
company’s financial statements.223 This would ensure that board risk committees 
would not solely have to rely on internal “experts”, who may be constrained to de-
emphasize potentially “bad” news when the firm is making a lot of profit from 
undertaking risky activities at a point in time.224 
Additionally, risk management needs to be integrated at a firm-wide level. The 
primary foundation for integration is better communication and coordination 
between the board and other actors in the firm. Accordingly, the channels for 
exchange of information need to be improved. One suggestion is to install parallel 
communication channels to improve the supply of information to boards.225 As 
Pirson and Turnbull point out, this proposal draws from the common-sense insight 
that additional communication channels allow for cross-checking and 
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supplementation of missing information flows, in the same way that courts require 
corroboration of testimony by independent witnesses.226 
How would such parallel communication channels be instituted? It is suggested 
that a model of network governance be adopted, where the board of directors is 
connected to various sub-boards representing various stakeholders in the firm, for 
example, an employee assembly and creditor’s council.227 The former would relay 
employee-generated information concerning solvency or operational risks to the 
firm, while the latter can advise the board on issues pertaining to liquidity, market, 
and credit risks.228 While this proposal may seem to involve a radical change to 
board structures, it is not without precedent. Hansen and Spitzeck cite evidence 
that cooperative banks, some of the few financial institutions to fare well during the 
crisis, consistently engaged their workers, suppliers, and customers in the 
governance process.229 Further, large companies such as HP and Shell are known to 
use stakeholder councils in advisory capacities and to gain strategic “on the ground” 
insight into their operations.230 
By improving information flows through institutionalizing network governance, 
the board moves significantly closer to integrating risk management at a firm-wide 
level. With the board receiving multiple sources of information regarding its risk 
position, it is then able to generate a quicker and more coordinated firm-wide 
response to an increase in its risk profile.231 Also, proper stress-testing can be carried 
out on a wider range of scenarios, to identify and pre-empt risks early on.232 Thus 
network governance can facilitate the integration of risk management structures 
and processes. 
D. Re-invigorating Board Duties: Intensifying and Clarifying Oversight 
Responsibilities 
Given that US law currently fails to extend a director’s obligation of monitoring to 
business risks, an expansion of directorial responsibility is in order. However, in 
pitching the standard and scope of this responsibility to monitor risk, one must be 
cognizant of the opposing policy consideration that risk management is a young 
discipline and that courts must be not seen as imposing liability on directors for a 
failure to adopt a specific model of risk management, lest they curb the evolutionary 
market processes by which optimal best practices emerge.233 
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It is proposed that liability for breach of the duty to monitor risks be pitched at 
the standard of gross negligence: i) either utterly failing to implement any risk 
management structures or controls,234 or ii) having implemented them, being 
grossly negligent in failing to oversee its operations, viz, failing to take note of red 
flags raised by the system in place. With respect to ii), the factors taken into account 
to determine whether a director is put on notice by a red flag include a) the 
potential harm to the company, b) the source of the red flag, and c) the frequency 
of the red flag.235 For example, with respect to potential harm, a director’s oversight 
responsibility would be more intensely engaged by a red flag regarding a $10 billion 
loss, as opposed to a $2 million loss. This would shield directors from liability for 
insignificant losses and unlikely risks; and focus directors’ attention on risks that 
would put a reasonable director on notice.236 With respect to the source of the red 
flag, inside reports showing under-capitalization, over-valuation or over-exposure 
to risk would be given more weight than outside sources, for example opinion 
pieces written by financial analysts.237 The frequency of the red flag is also a key 
indicator – passivity in the face of repeated exposures to a problem is suggestive of 
the dereliction of oversight duty. For example, in McCall v Scott,238 Bainbridge notes 
that signs of corporate employees’ health care fraud were repeatedly raised to the 
board, including audit discrepancies, reports by investigative journalists, and even 
criminal investigations in six different states – all of which the board consistently 
failed to take into account in discharging its oversight duties.239 Thus, this proposal 
aims to encompass management of risks within the scope of directors’ oversight 
responsibilities, in order to better safeguard against excessive risk-taking which 
threatens systemic stability; yet without placing the standard of care at too high a 
level which would be onerous for directors and potentially chill the development of 
risk management best practices. 
E. Re-conceiving the Role of Shareholders: From Rights to Responsibilities 
Given that the current problem is that of a lack of institutional shareholder 
responsibility in encouraging high-risk and short-termist strategies, reforms in the 
US geared further towards empowering shareholders, rather than conferring 
responsibilities on them, seem to be missing the point. As Bruner notes: “What is 
certainly surprising . . . is that policy makers . . . would seek to empower the very 
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stakeholder group whose incentives are most skewed toward the kind of excessive 
risk-taking that led to the crisis in the first place.”240 
One such misconceived reform, as pointed out by various commentators,241 is 
the provisions of the US Dodd-Frank Act which promote proxy access for 
shareholders in the hopes of encouraging more vigilant monitoring of managers 
and prudent risk management - under the SEC Rule 14a-11, shareholders holding 
3% of the company’s shares for more than 3 years can now nominate a director and 
place this nominee alongside nominees of the incumbent board, which provides a 
mechanism for shareholders to put their nominees on the ballot at the expense of 
the company, rather than incur the considerable personal expense of conducting a 
proxy contest.242 However, given the short-termist and self-interested tendencies of 
some institutional shareholders, the Dodd-Frank Act may end up having the 
“potentially pernicious effects” of allowing larger shareholders with proxy access to 
use the threat of a proxy fight as leverage to extract private benefits form a 
corporation – for example, to use the proxy as a “megaphone” for the shareholders’ 
causes or to pursue idiosyncratic corporate governance changes that may not be 
ultimately beneficial for the company.243 
Thus, the better approach would be to instil shareholder responsibilities, rather 
than expanding shareholder rights. Accordingly, I discuss two proposals to expand 
shareholder responsibilities: i) a more “extreme” proposal to confer fiduciary duties 
on all activist investors; and ii) a less radical proposal, recently implemented by the 
UK FRC, to confer a list of responsibilities on institutional shareholders in a 
“Stewardship Code”, backed on a “comply or explain” basis (as is the case with the 
current UK Corporate Governance code).244 Ultimately, this writer finds the second 
proposal more workable. 
The former proposal, as advocated by Anabtawi and Stout,245 would imbue all 
shareholders with latent fiduciary duties to the firm and their fellow shareholders; 
which would be triggered whenever a particular shareholder – whether or not 
formally capable of controlling a board’s decisions through voting rights – manages 
to exert an influence on the company’s actions with regard to an issue in which the 
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shareholder has a personal material interest.246 As long as the shareholder’s influence 
is a “but for” cause of some corporate transaction or strategy, that would amount to 
an exercise of shareholder control.247 Thus, investors with short-term horizons such 
as hedge funds, which commonly seek to influence board decisions on ordinary 
business decisions, such as the sale of dormant assets or the decrease of capital 
expenditures,248 would be obligated to consider the interests of all other stakeholders 
and shareholders in the firm. While this proposal is admirable in principle, as it 
aims at protecting long-term corporate value and the interests of the financial 
system and wider economy, it would open the door to increased litigation over the 
highly indefinite meaning of shareholder “control” or “influence”; and is a recipe 
for disastrous shareholder to shareholder litigation over potentially any issue in 
which various blocks of shareholders do not agree. 
A more acceptable solution to conferring responsibilities on institutional 
shareholders would be the UK Stewardship Code, a proposal first initiated by the 
UK Institutional Shareholders’ Committee and supported by the 2009 Walker 
Review.249 The code endows institutional investors with certain governance 
responsibilities, in the interest of improving long-term returns to shareholders and 
wider benefits to stakeholders, as well as reducing the risk of catastrophic outcomes 
to the system.250 For example, Principle 4 states that “[i]nstitutional investors should 
establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities as a 
method of protecting and enhancing shareholder value.”251 In the supporting 
guidance, instances where escalation and intervention are suggested include “risks 
arising from social and environmental matters.”252 Thus, the Stewardship Code 
encourages institutional investors to adopt a systemically-sustainable approach to 
investing, and to be accountable to all corporate stakeholders in the exercise of their 
voting powers. Further, unlike the previous proposal to impose duties on all activist 
shareholders, enforceable via litigation, the Stewardship Code is premised on a less 
onerous and more flexible “comply or explain” model, such that smaller 
institutional investors which are unable to, for example, report to companies on 
their voting activities (Principle 7) as regularly as bigger institutions, would not be 
forced to “comply” but can “explain” why their resources may constrain their 
ability to carry out their stewardship obligations.253 As Heineman suggests, the US 
should seriously consider adopting a similar proposal: “[The Stewardship Code] is 
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the most detailed attempt to date to give institutional and regulatory form to the 
belief that shareholders are part of the solution, not part of the problem, and that 
they have not just a right, but a duty, to engage with the companies in which they 
invest.”254 
Conclusion 
The advent of the global financial crisis has challenged our ideas of corporate 
governance. Specifically, it has forced us to re-think whether we are content with a 
paradigm of corporate governance which serves solely the interests of shareholders, 
or also the interests of the system that the corporate is embedded in. Accordingly, 
we are also compelled to re-think whether our current corporate governance 
mechanisms are apt to achieve these wider goals of systemic stability. 
While much of the current legal literature on post-crisis corporate governance 
does include proposals for reform, there is yet to be a study that begins from first 
principles to re-think the foundational purposes of corporate governance, and 
logically flowing from that, the means to achieve these purposes. This paper has 
attempted to do so by positing and defending a systemic stakeholder model for all 
public listed companies, where the interests of the economy and financial system 
are to be taken into account such companies. Flowing from this understanding of 
the ends of corporate governance, it has been argued that fundamental changes 
must be introduced to re-compose and re-structure the board, while increasing 
duties and responsibilities for directors and institutional shareholders. Collectively, 
the roles of directors and shareholders should be re-conceptualized as stewards for 
the system’s stake in the company. It is the hope of this writer that this provides a 
coherent paradigm, or at least the germ of an idea, for the revision of Anglo-
American corporate governance in the wake of the financial crisis. 
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